from SSA Clubs and Chapters:

Over the years I've come in contact with various club towplane operating procedures that made some attempt to address "shock cooling". These techniques often have the effect of substantially reducing the tow capability of a towplane during a busy day by increasing cycle time. Being the kind of person who always wants to know "why" when these kinds of facts are presented, I learned that there was no sound thermodynamic or metallurgical reasons for the practice. When I became our clubs Chief Tow Pilot and maintenance go-to guy I changed our procedures and worked with our towpilots to understand how our operational procedures might make our engines last longest yet yield the best tow service. Our procedure once the glider releases is to smoothly pull power to whatever setting is desired to get back to the pattern soonest and reduce mixture aggressively. If you belong to a club that has a prescribed "cool-down" procedure for towplane descents, you may be spending more on tow services than need be. The following from a more expert authority might be useful.
-----

Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth

RICK DURDEN

Some years ago, I had one of those “what in the world are they thinking?� conversations with a pilot who was towing gliders as a volunteer for the Civil Air Patrol. While he thought it was important to volunteer for a good group, he was ready to quit because of a screwy power reduction procedure imposed on the pilots by someone high up in the organization. The procedure was ostensibly to prevent cylinder cracking due to shock cooling during descent after the glider released. However, the procedure he described took so long that, even if the glider did several minutes of soaring during its flight, it was on the ground well before the tow plane. As a longtime tow pilot, this struck me as ludicrous.

The anti-shock-cooling exercise required a series of small reductions in manifold pressure, each followed by flying around for a period of time before making the next, while the airplane descended slowly, burning lots of fuel.. If shock cooling actually existed and caused cylinder cracking, it would probably be cheaper for the operation to have bought a bevy of cylinders and kept them on hand for replacement than pay for the fuel they were going through to avoid a phantasm.

I used to be astonished at how aviation myths, particularly when it came to engine operation, have such incredible staying power. Now, when I hear one spouted, I just shake my head in admiration of the influence of ignorance and belief over data. With some folks, the laws of physics, aerodynamics, metallurgy and thermodynamics are trumped by unwavering faith in their particular superstitions.

Nevertheless, when aviation superstitions get in the way of safe, efficient engine operation and addressing real risks of damage to engines, they need to be exposed for the nonsense they are, particularly when they are adversely affecting others—such as the glider operation that could only get off a few flights an hour. Such practices, especially when they are taught as fact to new pilots, only perpetuate the foolishness.

The widely respected Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it eloquently: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.�

There is absolutely no hard evidence that making a large power reduction will cause cracking of the cylinders of a horizontally opposed piston aircraft engine. Because people like examples, we’ll start with a few: Bob Hoover regularly shut down and feathered the engines on his Aero Commander Shrike during airshows—going from max power to none—and never cracked a cylinder. That’s consistent with what skydiving and glider tow operators have known for decades—their engines hit TBO without much in the way of cylinder problems, even though they descend rapidly at low power settings. Flight schools, with their repeated touch and goes, don’t go through cylinders at a disproportionate rate.

Let’s look at the numbers involved in engine cooling, starting with the small role that the cylinder fins play. Only about 12 percent of the heat generated by combustion departs from the engine via the cooling fins. The biggest proportion, 44 percent, goes out the tailpipe. Eight percent, almost as much as is handled by the cooling fins, is dissipated through the oil. Most of the rest is dissipated via the big, metal prop bolted to the crankshaft.

The engine manufacturer that has published data on the potential for shock-cooling damage—Lycoming—said to avoid the risk of damage, pilots should limit CHT reduction in flight to 50 degrees F per minute. The good news is that, even assuming such a rate of cooling will damage an engine—Lycoming said that damage potential existed only if done "consistently"—it’s nearly impossible to cool an engine that fast in flight even by shutting it down. In an article written by Kas Thomas more than 20 years ago and reprinted in AVweb, he went through the published test data—which showed that cutting engine power by half only reduces CHT by 10 percent or so. That kind of CHT drop isn’t capable of trashing cylinders—and isn’t anywhere close to the CHT change that occurs in the opposite direction on takeoff—shock heating, so to speak. And there’s never been any data to indicate that the massive shock heating during takeoff harms the cylinders.

Thomas also pointed out that flying through rain reduces CHTs by nearly as much as a 50 percent power reduction. There’s no history of airplanes regularly flown through rain having to constantly replace cylinders.

In fact, the real shock cooling comes at the end of the flight when you pull the mixture to idle cutoff and the CHTs drop at more than 100 degrees per minute right away—yet every engine goes through that sort of shock cooling and manages to survive it.

In the last 20 years, graphic engine monitors have become common in general aviation—and the data they provide further support conclusions reached before they were around regarding the minor effect of big power changes. Many monitors are set to alarm if the CHTs show a drop at a rate of more than 60 degrees per minute. Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. Mike Busch, A&P and principal of Savvy Aircraft Maintenance Management, told me during a conversation at an AOPA Fly-In that he’s tracked how fast CHTs will drop with various power reductions in his Cessna T310R. His observations were that it unusual to have CHTs drop at a rate of even 30 degrees per minute even with aggressive power reductions when ATC gives a slam-dunk approach.

In one of AVweb columnist John Deakin’s excellent articles on engine operation, he noted that when he waited 18 seconds to restart the engine of his Bonanza after running a tank dry, the CHTs only dropped 10 degrees.

In my opinion, It’s time to put the shock cooling myth to bed, so that pilots can worry about things that really are a risk to their safety and wallets—such as runway loss of control accidents. After all, with more than 25 percent of accidents that cause damage to the airplane and engine arising from loss of control on landing rollout it seems to me that rather than designing complex power reduction strategies to avoid a mythical risk of damaging an engine, we should be practicing crosswind landings to protect a real risk that actually does damage engines—and the airframes wrapped around them.

Rick Durden holds a CFII and ATP with type ratings in the Douglas DC-3 and Cessna Citation and is the author of The Thinking Pilot’s Flight Manual or, How to Survive Flying Little Airplanes and Have a Ball Doing it, Vols. 1 & 2.

On Saturday, January 6, 2018 at 8:40:13 AM UTC-5, wrote:
> from SSA Clubs and Chapters:
>
> Over the years I've come in contact with various club towplane operating procedures that made some attempt to address "shock cooling". These techniques often have the effect of substantially reducing the tow capability of a towplane during a busy day by increasing cycle time. Being the kind of person who always wants to know "why" when these kinds of facts are presented, I learned that there was no sound thermodynamic or metallurgical reasons for the practice. When I became our clubs Chief Tow Pilot and maintenance go-to guy I changed our procedures and worked with our towpilots to understand how our operational procedures might make our engines last longest yet yield the best tow service. Our procedure once the glider releases is to smoothly pull power to whatever setting is desired to get back to the pattern soonest and reduce mixture aggressively. If you belong to a club that has a prescribed "cool-down" procedure for towplane descents, you may be spending more on tow services than need be. The following from a more expert authority might be useful.
> -----
>
> Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth
>
> RICK DURDEN
>
> Some years ago, I had one of those “what in the world are they thinking?� conversations with a pilot who was towing gliders as a volunteer for the Civil Air Patrol. While he thought it was important to volunteer for a good group, he was ready to quit because of a screwy power reduction procedure imposed on the pilots by someone high up in the organization.. The procedure was ostensibly to prevent cylinder cracking due to shock cooling during descent after the glider released. However, the procedure he described took so long that, even if the glider did several minutes of soaring during its flight, it was on the ground well before the tow plane. As a longtime tow pilot, this struck me as ludicrous.
>
> The anti-shock-cooling exercise required a series of small reductions in manifold pressure, each followed by flying around for a period of time before making the next, while the airplane descended slowly, burning lots of fuel. If shock cooling actually existed and caused cylinder cracking, it would probably be cheaper for the operation to have bought a bevy of cylinders and kept them on hand for replacement than pay for the fuel they were going through to avoid a phantasm.
>
> I used to be astonished at how aviation myths, particularly when it came to engine operation, have such incredible staying power. Now, when I hear one spouted, I just shake my head in admiration of the influence of ignorance and belief over data. With some folks, the laws of physics, aerodynamics, metallurgy and thermodynamics are trumped by unwavering faith in their particular superstitions.
>
> Nevertheless, when aviation superstitions get in the way of safe, efficient engine operation and addressing real risks of damage to engines, they need to be exposed for the nonsense they are, particularly when they are adversely affecting others—such as the glider operation that could only get off a few flights an hour. Such practices, especially when they are taught as fact to new pilots, only perpetuate the foolishness.
>
> The widely respected Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it eloquently: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.�
>
> There is absolutely no hard evidence that making a large power reduction will cause cracking of the cylinders of a horizontally opposed piston aircraft engine. Because people like examples, we’ll start with a few: Bob Hoover regularly shut down and feathered the engines on his Aero Commander Shrike during airshows—going from max power to none—and never cracked a cylinder. That’s consistent with what skydiving and glider tow operators have known for decades—their engines hit TBO without much in the way of cylinder problems, even though they descend rapidly at low power settings. Flight schools, with their repeated touch and goes, don’t go through cylinders at a disproportionate rate.
>
> Let’s look at the numbers involved in engine cooling, starting with the small role that the cylinder fins play. Only about 12 percent of the heat generated by combustion departs from the engine via the cooling fins. The biggest proportion, 44 percent, goes out the tailpipe. Eight percent, almost as much as is handled by the cooling fins, is dissipated through the oil. Most of the rest is dissipated via the big, metal prop bolted to the crankshaft.
>
> The engine manufacturer that has published data on the potential for shock-cooling damage—Lycoming—said to avoid the risk of damage, pilots should limit CHT reduction in flight to 50 degrees F per minute. The good news is that, even assuming such a rate of cooling will damage an engine—Lycoming said that damage potential existed only if done "consistently"—it’s nearly impossible to cool an engine that fast in flight even by shutting it down. In an article written by Kas Thomas more than 20 years ago and reprinted in AVweb, he went through the published test data—which showed that cutting engine power by half only reduces CHT by 10 percent or so. That kind of CHT drop isn’t capable of trashing cylinders—and isn’t anywhere close to the CHT change that occurs in the opposite direction on takeoff—shock heating, so to speak. And there’s never been any data to indicate that the massive shock heating during takeoff harms the cylinders.
>
> Thomas also pointed out that flying through rain reduces CHTs by nearly as much as a 50 percent power reduction. There’s no history of airplanes regularly flown through rain having to constantly replace cylinders.
>
> In fact, the real shock cooling comes at the end of the flight when you pull the mixture to idle cutoff and the CHTs drop at more than 100 degrees per minute right away—yet every engine goes through that sort of shock cooling and manages to survive it.
>
> In the last 20 years, graphic engine monitors have become common in general aviation—and the data they provide further support conclusions reached before they were around regarding the minor effect of big power changes. Many monitors are set to alarm if the CHTs show a drop at a rate of more than 60 degrees per minute. Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. Mike Busch, A&P and principal of Savvy Aircraft Maintenance Management, told me during a conversation at an AOPA Fly-In that he’s tracked how fast CHTs will drop with various power reductions in his Cessna T310R. His observations were that it unusual to have CHTs drop at a rate of even 30 degrees per minute even with aggressive power reductions when ATC gives a slam-dunk approach.
>
> In one of AVweb columnist John Deakin’s excellent articles on engine operation, he noted that when he waited 18 seconds to restart the engine of his Bonanza after running a tank dry, the CHTs only dropped 10 degrees..
>
> In my opinion, It’s time to put the shock cooling myth to bed, so that pilots can worry about things that really are a risk to their safety and wallets—such as runway loss of control accidents. After all, with more than 25 percent of accidents that cause damage to the airplane and engine arising from loss of control on landing rollout it seems to me that rather than designing complex power reduction strategies to avoid a mythical risk of damaging an engine, we should be practicing crosswind landings to protect a real risk that actually does damage engines—and the airframes wrapped around them.
>
> Rick Durden holds a CFII and ATP with type ratings in the Douglas DC-3 and Cessna Citation and is the author of The Thinking Pilot’s Flight Manual or, How to Survive Flying Little Airplanes and Have a Ball Doing it, Vols. 1 & 2.

I don't see a recommendation as to the procedure the writer thinks should be used.
We run 4 cylinder Lycoming engines in Cub and Pawnee. Our procedure is to reduce power smoothly after release while establishing a descent air speed of 2300 rpm.
We fly a profile in descent and through the pattern that holds that condition until base leg where speed and throttle are progressively reduced to glide condition on final. We try for a little over 2 minutes from release to final power reduction. CHT normally has dropped from 230C to a little under 200 by that time. We don't mess with mixture. It is just one more thing to forget before the next launch. Our typical turn time is about 7-1/2 minutes for the Pawnee(180 HP) pulling a 2-33 to 2000 feet.
We have found one cracked cylinder in the last 10 years over about 15000 tows.
FWIW
UH

As Uncle Hank said:
"I don't see a recommendation as to the procedure the writer thinks should be used."

I'm all ears and would consider a different descent procedure, but I use a similar procedure as Hank and not cracked a cylinder in decades. That's how my father (Captain Fritz Compton / A&P) taught me in 1968 as well as advice from mechanics and engine overhaulers. Seems that the owner of the towplane has the final say.

So if "shock-cooling" is a myth, so be it. I'll stick to my descent procedure until convinced otherwise.
If I buy into that shock-cooling is a myth will the writer of the article pay for a cracked cylinder replacement? Give me a new procedure / reason to change!

A real concern for me is a potential midair with an aircraft below release altitude when aggressively diving the towplane down after release, so my towpilots make a slow descent, looking outside. What's the hurry? As my Dad (who flew the US Mail for Eastern Air Lines starting in 1939) said, "Take it slow son, we ain't flyin' the mail, just gliders."

Then again, y'all do what you want . . . my way isn't the only way.

We are running 2 Lycoming 235 Pawnees (one wide deck & one narrow deck) and a Continental L-19. We went through a spate of cracked cylinders (3 - In two different aircraft as I recall) about 4 years ago but I am not sure it had anything really to do with cool down procedures. Then the problem went away with no good explanation. Our method is to hold 2000 - 2100 rpm for a minute after glider release while descending then make a normal landing. I suspect that there are other issues involved in cylinder cracking: quality control in cylinder manufacture, torque variations in cylinder installation, localized vibration caused by cylinder/piston/ring fit, front vs rear cylinders (they cool differently), valve adjustment, and plain bad luck.
ROY - GBSC Boston (where it is really cold this morning!)

When confronted with the bugaboo of cylinder shock cooling, my response,
even before reading the subject article, has always been: "What about
flying through rain?"Â* There's never been a cogent reply to that.

As to my procedure before retiring from towing, I simply reduced power
(throttle and prop) as necessary to arrive on downwind, at pattern speed
as quickly as possible, from wherever the glider released.Â* It's
difficult to tell a dozen glider pilots waiting for a tow, to "Slow
down, we're not hauling the mail"...Â* BTW, I'm not aware of any cracked
cylinders in 28 years of towing.

PS - I really enjoyed the original article and, from reading the
responses, see that there are folks out there who still cling to the myth.

On 1/6/2018 8:03 AM, Roy B. wrote:
> We are running 2 Lycoming 235 Pawnees (one wide deck & one narrow deck) and a Continental L-19. We went through a spate of cracked cylinders (3 - In two different aircraft as I recall) about 4 years ago but I am not sure it had anything really to do with cool down procedures. Then the problem went away with no good explanation. Our method is to hold 2000 - 2100 rpm for a minute after glider release while descending then make a normal landing. I suspect that there are other issues involved in cylinder cracking: quality control in cylinder manufacture, torque variations in cylinder installation, localized vibration caused by cylinder/piston/ring fit, front vs rear cylinders (they cool differently), valve adjustment, and plain bad luck.
> ROY - GBSC Boston (where it is really cold this morning!)

--
Dan, 5J

On Saturday, January 6, 2018 at 8:40:13 AM UTC-5, wrote:
> from SSA Clubs and Chapters:
>
> Over the years I've come in contact with various club towplane operating procedures that made some attempt to address "shock cooling". These techniques often have the effect of substantially reducing the tow capability of a towplane during a busy day by increasing cycle time. Being the kind of person who always wants to know "why" when these kinds of facts are presented, I learned that there was no sound thermodynamic or metallurgical reasons for the practice. When I became our clubs Chief Tow Pilot and maintenance go-to guy I changed our procedures and worked with our towpilots to understand how our operational procedures might make our engines last longest yet yield the best tow service. Our procedure once the glider releases is to smoothly pull power to whatever setting is desired to get back to the pattern soonest and reduce mixture aggressively. If you belong to a club that has a prescribed "cool-down" procedure for towplane descents, you may be spending more on tow services than need be. The following from a more expert authority might be useful.
> -----
>
> Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth
>
> RICK DURDEN
>
> Some years ago, I had one of those “what in the world are they thinking?� conversations with a pilot who was towing gliders as a volunteer for the Civil Air Patrol. While he thought it was important to volunteer for a good group, he was ready to quit because of a screwy power reduction procedure imposed on the pilots by someone high up in the organization.. The procedure was ostensibly to prevent cylinder cracking due to shock cooling during descent after the glider released. However, the procedure he described took so long that, even if the glider did several minutes of soaring during its flight, it was on the ground well before the tow plane. As a longtime tow pilot, this struck me as ludicrous.
>
> The anti-shock-cooling exercise required a series of small reductions in manifold pressure, each followed by flying around for a period of time before making the next, while the airplane descended slowly, burning lots of fuel. If shock cooling actually existed and caused cylinder cracking, it would probably be cheaper for the operation to have bought a bevy of cylinders and kept them on hand for replacement than pay for the fuel they were going through to avoid a phantasm.
>
> I used to be astonished at how aviation myths, particularly when it came to engine operation, have such incredible staying power. Now, when I hear one spouted, I just shake my head in admiration of the influence of ignorance and belief over data. With some folks, the laws of physics, aerodynamics, metallurgy and thermodynamics are trumped by unwavering faith in their particular superstitions.
>
> Nevertheless, when aviation superstitions get in the way of safe, efficient engine operation and addressing real risks of damage to engines, they need to be exposed for the nonsense they are, particularly when they are adversely affecting others—such as the glider operation that could only get off a few flights an hour. Such practices, especially when they are taught as fact to new pilots, only perpetuate the foolishness.
>
> The widely respected Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it eloquently: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.�
>
> There is absolutely no hard evidence that making a large power reduction will cause cracking of the cylinders of a horizontally opposed piston aircraft engine. Because people like examples, we’ll start with a few: Bob Hoover regularly shut down and feathered the engines on his Aero Commander Shrike during airshows—going from max power to none—and never cracked a cylinder. That’s consistent with what skydiving and glider tow operators have known for decades—their engines hit TBO without much in the way of cylinder problems, even though they descend rapidly at low power settings. Flight schools, with their repeated touch and goes, don’t go through cylinders at a disproportionate rate.
>
> Let’s look at the numbers involved in engine cooling, starting with the small role that the cylinder fins play. Only about 12 percent of the heat generated by combustion departs from the engine via the cooling fins. The biggest proportion, 44 percent, goes out the tailpipe. Eight percent, almost as much as is handled by the cooling fins, is dissipated through the oil. Most of the rest is dissipated via the big, metal prop bolted to the crankshaft.
>
> The engine manufacturer that has published data on the potential for shock-cooling damage—Lycoming—said to avoid the risk of damage, pilots should limit CHT reduction in flight to 50 degrees F per minute. The good news is that, even assuming such a rate of cooling will damage an engine—Lycoming said that damage potential existed only if done "consistently"—it’s nearly impossible to cool an engine that fast in flight even by shutting it down. In an article written by Kas Thomas more than 20 years ago and reprinted in AVweb, he went through the published test data—which showed that cutting engine power by half only reduces CHT by 10 percent or so. That kind of CHT drop isn’t capable of trashing cylinders—and isn’t anywhere close to the CHT change that occurs in the opposite direction on takeoff—shock heating, so to speak. And there’s never been any data to indicate that the massive shock heating during takeoff harms the cylinders.
>
> Thomas also pointed out that flying through rain reduces CHTs by nearly as much as a 50 percent power reduction. There’s no history of airplanes regularly flown through rain having to constantly replace cylinders.
>
> In fact, the real shock cooling comes at the end of the flight when you pull the mixture to idle cutoff and the CHTs drop at more than 100 degrees per minute right away—yet every engine goes through that sort of shock cooling and manages to survive it.
>
> In the last 20 years, graphic engine monitors have become common in general aviation—and the data they provide further support conclusions reached before they were around regarding the minor effect of big power changes. Many monitors are set to alarm if the CHTs show a drop at a rate of more than 60 degrees per minute. Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. Mike Busch, A&P and principal of Savvy Aircraft Maintenance Management, told me during a conversation at an AOPA Fly-In that he’s tracked how fast CHTs will drop with various power reductions in his Cessna T310R. His observations were that it unusual to have CHTs drop at a rate of even 30 degrees per minute even with aggressive power reductions when ATC gives a slam-dunk approach.
>
> In one of AVweb columnist John Deakin’s excellent articles on engine operation, he noted that when he waited 18 seconds to restart the engine of his Bonanza after running a tank dry, the CHTs only dropped 10 degrees..
>
> In my opinion, It’s time to put the shock cooling myth to bed, so that pilots can worry about things that really are a risk to their safety and wallets—such as runway loss of control accidents. After all, with more than 25 percent of accidents that cause damage to the airplane and engine arising from loss of control on landing rollout it seems to me that rather than designing complex power reduction strategies to avoid a mythical risk of damaging an engine, we should be practicing crosswind landings to protect a real risk that actually does damage engines—and the airframes wrapped around them.
>
> Rick Durden holds a CFII and ATP with type ratings in the Douglas DC-3 and Cessna Citation and is the author of The Thinking Pilot’s Flight Manual or, How to Survive Flying Little Airplanes and Have a Ball Doing it, Vols. 1 & 2.

I'm all for the debunking of myths.

Mr Durden hasn't debunked a thing. He's offered opinions, speculation, at least one demonstrable untruth (cooling rate following shutdown) and one obvious misunderstanding. Anyone with a mechanics of materials background in the heat engine industry understands that the upshock and downshock create different stress profiles and that it's the downshock that generally causes failure.

We fly our L-19 110 mph / 2250 rpm / leaned in descent and see 800 - 1000 fpm down during that time. We have a single cylinder TC gauge of dubious accuracy that seems to indicate we are (just) within Continental's 25 C/ min recommendation on cooling. We don't have problems. We *think* we're being about as aggressive in the let down as we should be. What could we be leaving on the table? 1 minute and a half a gallon of gas? It doesn't seem like a lot.

best,
Evan Ludeman / T8

I had a soaring operation based out of las vegas nv. Cht's would getting pretty high towing three folks in a 2-32 to 3k ft on a 105 degree F day. But there is a simple solution that we used to both get down quick for the next tow and keep temps normalized.

After release we would throttle back to around 1400 rpms but then drop flaps and use a hard slip to decend. The hard slip would give us greater than 1500 fpm down while it also disrupts the airflow into the engine thus maintaining cylinder temps. This worked fantastically and in over 800 hours on a 260 pawnee towing one year we never had a single cylinder cracking issue.

I have to disagree with the premise of the OP as well. My club running a 180 Citabria, a 235 Pawnee and a 260 Pawnee had a plethora of cracked jugs over the years. We had a couple of guys, who designed and built a monitor that measured (amongst other things) CHT of all 4-6 cylinders, RPM, airspeed, altitude.

They installed it in a towplane and flew 100's of tows in each type to measure what was happening using many let down techniques. What they found is that a good let down procedure really depends on the aircraft type. For example, the Citabria with it's tight cowling was very sensitive to airspeed changes combined with power reductions after glider release and the 45-50 F cooling rate/min could easily be exceeded at this point in the let down if power was reduced to rapidly and airspeed increased too rapidly. The Pawnee with its huge cowling and lots of cooling air was not sensitive to this rapid cooling at the top of the descent, but if aggressive cooling did not occur after glider release, then upon pulling back power on final to land the cooling rate spiked above the recommended value.

Having recently flown a Pawnee with a JPI EDM700 installed that displays the cooling rate of the most rapidly cooled cylinder, I saw exactly this. The cooling rate spiked right about touchdown, but could be easily reduced by adding power after landing (1000-1200 rpm seemed to work).

The monitoring system was also installed in an L-19 at another club and as I recall it was also found that the L-19 is quite sensitive to rapid cooling right after glider release.

I don't claim to have the best let down around as we are still cracking jugs at times and many other operators don't crack any, but to say that shock cooling is a myth is just wrong based on my experience and the measured data.

If you have a procedure that is working for you and preventing cracked jugs, stick with it!

I have to disagree with the premise of the OP as well. My club running a 180 Citabria, a 235 Pawnee and a 260 Pawnee had a plethora of cracked jugs over the years. We had a couple of guys, who designed and built a monitor that measured (amongst other things) CHT of all 4-6 cylinders, RPM, airspeed, altitude.

They installed it in a towplane and flew 100's of tows in each type to measure what was happening using many let down techniques. What they found is that a good let down procedure really depends on the aircraft type. For example, the Citabria with it's tight cowling was very sensitive to airspeed changes combined with power reductions after glider release and the 45-50 F cooling rate/min could easily be exceeded at this point in the let down if power was reduced too rapidly and airspeed increased too rapidly. The Pawnee with its huge cowling and lots of cooling air was not sensitive to this rapid cooling at the top of the descent, but if aggressive cooling did not occur after glider release, then upon pulling back power on final to land the cooling rate spiked above the recommended value.

Having recently flown a Pawnee with a JPI EDM700 installed that displays the cooling rate of the most rapidly cooled cylinder, I saw exactly this. The cooling rate spiked right about touchdown, but could be easily reduced by adding power after landing (1000-1200 rpm seemed to work).

The monitoring system was also installed in an L-19 at another club and as I recall it was also found that the L-19 is quite sensitive to rapid cooling right after glider release.

I don't claim to have the best let down around as we are still cracking jugs at times and many other operators don't crack any, but to say that shock cooling is a myth is just wrong based on my experience and the measured data.

If you have a procedure that is working for you and preventing cracked jugs, stick with it!

Le samedi 6 janvier 2018 14:40:13 UTC+1, a écritÂ*:
> Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth
> RICK DURDEN
> [...]
> Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. [...]

Well, that's exacly the kind of thing some tug pilots love to do. I even had one dive away before my pupil had time to release. Must be pilots who regret not having been flying Stukas in WWII. But Stukas had dive brakes...

On Sunday, January 7, 2018 at 2:51:02 AM UTC-6, wrote:
> Le samedi 6 janvier 2018 14:40:13 UTC+1, a écritÂ*:
> > Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth
> > RICK DURDEN
> > [...]
> > Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. [...]
>
> Well, that's exacly the kind of thing some tug pilots love to do. I even had one dive away before my pupil had time to release. Must be pilots who regret not having been flying Stukas in WWII. But Stukas had dive brakes...

Used to tow behind P1's C-172 in NC. Had one towpilot who loved to split-s the 172 when the glider released. Pull the release, see the whole dirty belly of the 172 as it fell away inverted. Same guy got hauled into court on a noise complaint having to do with waterskiing behind a Republic Seabee.

On Saturday, January 6, 2018 at 8:40:13 AM UTC-5, wrote:
> from SSA Clubs and Chapters:
>
>>.... I learned that there was no sound thermodynamic or metallurgical reasons for the practice. <<

That statement piqued my interest. Does anyone know what the metal alloy and heat treatment of these cylinder castings are?
From a metallurgical point of view, repeated heat cycling of any metal will fatigue it at the grain boundaries which ultimately will lead to a failure.. In gas turbine designs, high Nickel alloys are used to make the blades, nozzles and everything else in the hot gas path and even those experience thermo-cycle fatigue and cracking despite paying painstaking attention to lower the stress risers in the design.

Uli
'AS'

Well, since it was published and on the internet, it must be true. Right?

Lasham Gliding Society do many thousands of aerotows each year, using
Robin DR400, Super Cub and Pawnee. There used to be a steady incidence
of cracked cylinders. After instituting a standard engine handling
procedure
this stopped, and saved a lot of expence and tug downtime. The procedure
doesn't significantly increase turnround time; in the recent Europeans held

at Lasham, 60 Competition launches to 2000ft took typically 30 minutes.

The club has a comprehensive tow pilot manual, which you can find at

https://tinyurl.com/y7w9otoa

and engine handling on descent is section 2.21

On Sunday, January 7, 2018 at 3:38:34 PM UTC-5, Steve Leonard wrote:
> Well, since it was published and on the internet, it must be true. Right?

Steve - you can't believe everything you read on the internet! Remember - that's how WW-I got started!
Uli
'Uli'

Really? Al Gore had not invented the Internet back then...sheesh, he wasn't even born yet!
Don't believe me? Look it up on the Internet, he stated he invented the Internet......!



LOL......
Sigh.......

As the club treasurer, of course my interest is piqued.

We installed a computerized CHT analyzer. It made everyone sort of 'experiment' a bit with technique. I could very easily find many ways to trip the 'shock cooling' alarm.

They all seemed to be when I tried any method to fly 'fast' downhill.

Seemed in the bird dog, you could cover a lot of ground, and go down at 1k FPM... OR you could fly slow, and come down at 1k FPM. The slow way made you keep the shock cooling alarm from going off.

Kind of answered it for me. :)

The analyzer did reveal a pilot who was not operating at WOT. The temps he was reporting gave away that he had been taught the wrong way. He was running VERY hot on the climbs. Need that fuel for cooling.

JP

A good laugh is almost as good as an hour in the air.Â* Thanks!

On 1/7/2018 5:03 PM, Charlie M. (UH & 002 owner/pilot) wrote:
> Really? Al Gore had not invented the Internet back then...sheesh, he wasn't even born yet!
> Don't believe me? Look it up on the Internet, he stated he invented the Internet......!
>
>
>
> LOL......
> Sigh.......

--
Dan, 5J

I "believe" a part of this is......steep bank, pull stick, keep upper front hinge of cowling on horizon, drop like a "homesick brick". Part of this makes airflow ACROSS the cowling inlets, thus dropping airflow through the engine.

This is NOT a "dive towards the ground"..,,,,

Yes, Hank can elaborate if he feels the need to......

Yep Charlies, that was I was explaining in my earlier post, hard slip= slow speed, large rate of decent and disrupted airflow into cowl hence keeps the cht up. Works liike a champ but half the guys out there flying have ever done a hard slip and even less use it on a regular basis.
Dan

On Monday, January 8, 2018 at 7:07:06 PM UTC-5, wrote:
> Yep Charlies, that was I was explaining in my earlier post, hard slip= slow speed, large rate of decent and disrupted airflow into cowl hence keeps the cht up. Works liike a champ but half the guys out there flying have ever done a hard slip and even less use it on a regular basis.
> Dan

The L-19 will slip hard enough to dump a lot of fuel overboard if the tanks are full. We don't consider this an operational advantage.

Still, in terms of angle off the direction of motion, it isn't that big an angle (guessing 20 degrees, rudder on the floor). Intuitively, I doubt that it is possible to significantly disrupt the intake airflow with a steady state slip. Someone bring the data, prove me wrong.

Evan Ludeman / T8

Evan, the data was found refering to a 6 cylinder cht that we had in our pawnee. Also reconfirmed on a 200hp Stinson also with 6 position cht. Doubt away, the technique does work, been using it for 30 years, have never cracked a cylinder. And regarding your bird dog (glorified 170) venting fuel, I hope your not towing with topped off tanks, that extra weight costs you time and money in the long haul unless where you operate doesn't have handy fuel available. We always operated with 3/4 tanks but note we were flying in extreme density altitude conditions.

I will agree the slip angle likely makes minimal difference in engine cooling.
I WILL say a high slip angle makes the tug come down pretty fast with not a lot of airspeed, adding some "G load" at the same time helps as well.
Airspeed (straight on or angled) is still flow through the cylinder fins.
So.......lower speed and slightly reduced airflow can only help, the slip adds to sink rate. That IS part of the goal....correct?
Turnaround time, lack of adding to maintenance..........right?

On Saturday, January 6, 2018 at 6:40:13 AM UTC-7, wrote:
> from SSA Clubs and Chapters:
>
> Over the years I've come in contact with various club towplane operating procedures that made some attempt to address "shock cooling". These techniques often have the effect of substantially reducing the tow capability of a towplane during a busy day by increasing cycle time. Being the kind of person who always wants to know "why" when these kinds of facts are presented, I learned that there was no sound thermodynamic or metallurgical reasons for the practice. When I became our clubs Chief Tow Pilot and maintenance go-to guy I changed our procedures and worked with our towpilots to understand how our operational procedures might make our engines last longest yet yield the best tow service. Our procedure once the glider releases is to smoothly pull power to whatever setting is desired to get back to the pattern soonest and reduce mixture aggressively. If you belong to a club that has a prescribed "cool-down" procedure for towplane descents, you may be spending more on tow services than need be. The following from a more expert authority might be useful.
> -----
>
> Shock Cooling: Time To Kill The Myth
>
> RICK DURDEN
>
> Some years ago, I had one of those “what in the world are they thinking?� conversations with a pilot who was towing gliders as a volunteer for the Civil Air Patrol. While he thought it was important to volunteer for a good group, he was ready to quit because of a screwy power reduction procedure imposed on the pilots by someone high up in the organization.. The procedure was ostensibly to prevent cylinder cracking due to shock cooling during descent after the glider released. However, the procedure he described took so long that, even if the glider did several minutes of soaring during its flight, it was on the ground well before the tow plane. As a longtime tow pilot, this struck me as ludicrous.
>
> The anti-shock-cooling exercise required a series of small reductions in manifold pressure, each followed by flying around for a period of time before making the next, while the airplane descended slowly, burning lots of fuel. If shock cooling actually existed and caused cylinder cracking, it would probably be cheaper for the operation to have bought a bevy of cylinders and kept them on hand for replacement than pay for the fuel they were going through to avoid a phantasm.
>
> I used to be astonished at how aviation myths, particularly when it came to engine operation, have such incredible staying power. Now, when I hear one spouted, I just shake my head in admiration of the influence of ignorance and belief over data. With some folks, the laws of physics, aerodynamics, metallurgy and thermodynamics are trumped by unwavering faith in their particular superstitions.
>
> Nevertheless, when aviation superstitions get in the way of safe, efficient engine operation and addressing real risks of damage to engines, they need to be exposed for the nonsense they are, particularly when they are adversely affecting others—such as the glider operation that could only get off a few flights an hour. Such practices, especially when they are taught as fact to new pilots, only perpetuate the foolishness.
>
> The widely respected Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it eloquently: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.�
>
> There is absolutely no hard evidence that making a large power reduction will cause cracking of the cylinders of a horizontally opposed piston aircraft engine. Because people like examples, we’ll start with a few: Bob Hoover regularly shut down and feathered the engines on his Aero Commander Shrike during airshows—going from max power to none—and never cracked a cylinder. That’s consistent with what skydiving and glider tow operators have known for decades—their engines hit TBO without much in the way of cylinder problems, even though they descend rapidly at low power settings. Flight schools, with their repeated touch and goes, don’t go through cylinders at a disproportionate rate.
>
> Let’s look at the numbers involved in engine cooling, starting with the small role that the cylinder fins play. Only about 12 percent of the heat generated by combustion departs from the engine via the cooling fins. The biggest proportion, 44 percent, goes out the tailpipe. Eight percent, almost as much as is handled by the cooling fins, is dissipated through the oil. Most of the rest is dissipated via the big, metal prop bolted to the crankshaft.
>
> The engine manufacturer that has published data on the potential for shock-cooling damage—Lycoming—said to avoid the risk of damage, pilots should limit CHT reduction in flight to 50 degrees F per minute. The good news is that, even assuming such a rate of cooling will damage an engine—Lycoming said that damage potential existed only if done "consistently"—it’s nearly impossible to cool an engine that fast in flight even by shutting it down. In an article written by Kas Thomas more than 20 years ago and reprinted in AVweb, he went through the published test data—which showed that cutting engine power by half only reduces CHT by 10 percent or so. That kind of CHT drop isn’t capable of trashing cylinders—and isn’t anywhere close to the CHT change that occurs in the opposite direction on takeoff—shock heating, so to speak. And there’s never been any data to indicate that the massive shock heating during takeoff harms the cylinders.
>
> Thomas also pointed out that flying through rain reduces CHTs by nearly as much as a 50 percent power reduction. There’s no history of airplanes regularly flown through rain having to constantly replace cylinders.
>
> In fact, the real shock cooling comes at the end of the flight when you pull the mixture to idle cutoff and the CHTs drop at more than 100 degrees per minute right away—yet every engine goes through that sort of shock cooling and manages to survive it.
>
> In the last 20 years, graphic engine monitors have become common in general aviation—and the data they provide further support conclusions reached before they were around regarding the minor effect of big power changes. Many monitors are set to alarm if the CHTs show a drop at a rate of more than 60 degrees per minute. Pilots are discovering that it’s nearly impossible to hit that rate without slamming the throttle shut and diving—which isn’t comfortable for anyone in the airplane. Mike Busch, A&P and principal of Savvy Aircraft Maintenance Management, told me during a conversation at an AOPA Fly-In that he’s tracked how fast CHTs will drop with various power reductions in his Cessna T310R. His observations were that it unusual to have CHTs drop at a rate of even 30 degrees per minute even with aggressive power reductions when ATC gives a slam-dunk approach.
>
> In one of AVweb columnist John Deakin’s excellent articles on engine operation, he noted that when he waited 18 seconds to restart the engine of his Bonanza after running a tank dry, the CHTs only dropped 10 degrees..
>
> In my opinion, It’s time to put the shock cooling myth to bed, so that pilots can worry about things that really are a risk to their safety and wallets—such as runway loss of control accidents. After all, with more than 25 percent of accidents that cause damage to the airplane and engine arising from loss of control on landing rollout it seems to me that rather than designing complex power reduction strategies to avoid a mythical risk of damaging an engine, we should be practicing crosswind landings to protect a real risk that actually does damage engines—and the airframes wrapped around them.
>
> Rick Durden holds a CFII and ATP with type ratings in the Douglas DC-3 and Cessna Citation and is the author of The Thinking Pilot’s Flight Manual or, How to Survive Flying Little Airplanes and Have a Ball Doing it, Vols. 1 & 2.

To the OP, Initiating discussion on engine management is good, but as others have pointed out, the accompanying article is pretty much pointless. To the authors defense, I am sure his editor pushes for sensationalism and hype for the sake of web traffic or magazine subscriptions as the case may be. This type of "National Enquirer" style journalism has caused many (Including myself) to quit reading aviation publications and blogs (And for that matter, Facebook).
So keep reading and posting this stuff but understand that the vast majority of Aviation Journalism is garbage.

Yes, Rick's research harmonizes with mine.

Ed Kollin, who ran the Exxon engine-testing lab before retiring early to market Camguard, says "There is no such thing as shock cooling, but shock heating is damaging. Going to full power on an aircraft engine that is not yet at operating temperature stresses metals that have not expanded to fit properly."

It's also true, as I've learned from experience, that CHTs near manufacturer CHT redlines are safe only briefly at best. Aluminum begins to soften above 400°F, and rings begin to lose temper. A single overtemp incident by a mechanic working on my aircraft's engine, not following book mixture-adjustment procedures, caused 4 broken rings, gradually discovered during later inspections.

Ed recommends CHTs optimally at or below 380°F, and has noted that severely LOP mixtures with low CHTs lead to lead fouling of exhaust-valve guides, leading to exhaust-valve sticking.

I see guys taking off with barely-warm engines frequently.

On Tuesday, January 9, 2018 at 1:32:52 PM UTC-5, K m wrote:
> To the OP, Initiating discussion on engine management is good, but as others >have pointed out, the accompanying article is pretty much pointless.
So I was the "Original Poster", and fair enough on what you said. I didn't sign my name to it because I only posted the info, I did not originate either what seems to come from the SSA Clubs and Chapter group or the article author.

I did want to start a discussion, and glad I did - I've learned a lot and this is not an area of expertise at all for me, so I'm in listening mode.

I do notice that the article AND a lot of the posting by people defending their well honed procedures that there is very little scientific method here.
There appears to be a lot of correlation mixed up with causation. A lot of anecdotal stories and little statistical data based on controlled conditions.
This is understandable of course as it would take a large institutional type research budget to set up statistically significant control groups and study one factor at a time.

Someone lobby for NASA to do a study, otherwise we can go with crossing our fingers as we cut back the power and clutch tight on the rabbit's foot.


Chris

On Tuesday, January 9, 2018 at 7:30:15 PM UTC-5, wrote:
> On Tuesday, January 9, 2018 at 1:32:52 PM UTC-5, K m wrote:
> > To the OP, Initiating discussion on engine management is good, but as others >have pointed out, the accompanying article is pretty much pointless.
> So I was the "Original Poster", and fair enough on what you said. I didn't sign my name to it because I only posted the info, I did not originate either what seems to come from the SSA Clubs and Chapter group or the article author.
>
> I did want to start a discussion, and glad I did - I've learned a lot and this is not an area of expertise at all for me, so I'm in listening mode.
>
> I do notice that the article AND a lot of the posting by people defending their well honed procedures that there is very little scientific method here.
> There appears to be a lot of correlation mixed up with causation. A lot of anecdotal stories and little statistical data based on controlled conditions.
> This is understandable of course as it would take a large institutional type research budget to set up statistically significant control groups and study one factor at a time.
>
> Someone lobby for NASA to do a study, otherwise we can go with crossing our fingers as we cut back the power and clutch tight on the rabbit's foot.
>
>
> Chris

See Soaring mag, Dec 1992, pg 40 & April 1993, pg 22. Good study for those particular aircraft (Citabria and Pawnee). Too bad about the poorly legible figures.

Rapid cooling -- in excess of manufacturers' recommendations -- is no myth. Whether it causes damage over the long or short term is another issue altogether.

best,
Evan Ludeman / T8

There is a line of thinking that most cylinders failures are caused more by Manufacturing issues than anything else.
One way to collect data for this especially when aircraft production was higher was to look at trade-a-plane adds for aircraft that still had factory engines in them. As I recall for a while it was pretty easy to see that certain years of C-210's rarely went over 500hrs without a top overhaul. I believe you can still see this with Franklin engines in Stinsons.

As the fleet ages and aircraft are on the 2nd, 3rd or more engines it is harder to see patterns like this, as it is hard to collect data on who made the cylinders and when they were made.

On the other hand I love engine monitors and prefer to treat the engines nicely when practical to do so.

On Thursday, January 11, 2018 at 3:35:55 PM UTC-5, Brian wrote:
> There is a line of thinking that most cylinders failures are caused more by Manufacturing issues than anything else.
> One way to collect data for this especially when aircraft production was higher was to look at trade-a-plane adds for aircraft that still had factory engines in them. As I recall for a while it was pretty easy to see that certain years of C-210's rarely went over 500hrs without a top overhaul. I believe you can still see this with Franklin engines in Stinsons.
>
> As the fleet ages and aircraft are on the 2nd, 3rd or more engines it is harder to see patterns like this, as it is hard to collect data on who made the cylinders and when they were made.
>
> On the other hand I love engine monitors and prefer to treat the engines nicely when practical to do so.

We had multiple failures during the ECI debacle. We overhauled with ECI and had 3 failures, all in the air. Heads came off. They replaced free of charge. After the 3rd, our overhaul shop told them we wanted our money back. They refunded all our money plus some bucks toward install of replacement Lycoming cylinders.No questions asked. Not long after that the AD came out.
FWIW
UH